We use a mechanism design approach to illustrate how di¤erent environments of private information and limited commitment generate di¤erent …nancial frictions. We show that limitations in commitment and private information lead to a permanent income theory of consumption with borrowing constraints.
Introduction
In a thought provoking article "Can a "Credit Crunch" Be E¢ cient?" Edward Green and Soo Nam Oh use a mechanism design approach to present a model of …nancial intermediation in which phenomena qualitatively resembling a "credit crunch" occur but are e¢ cient. In this short paper, we extend and modify the model of Green and Oh in order to examine how di¤erent environments of private information and limited commitment generate different …nancial frictions. Following a tradition of mechanism design, which considers the market structure as an equilibrium outcome of the underlying environment, we ask questions such as: Which markets are open? Which contracts are used? Which institutions arise? We …nd that the model of Green and Oh is a useful benchmark to explain the recent literature on the mechanism design approach to …nancial frictions.
Model of Green and Oh
There is a continuum of agents with population size being normalized to one. All agents live for three dates, dates 0, 1, and 2. There is one homogeneous goods at each date. At date 0, everyone is identical and signs a contract. At date 1, an idiosyncratic income shock realizes, and each agent receives either a high income (or endowment) y h with probability h ; or receives a low income y l with probability l , where 0 < y l < y h and h + l = 1: We assume that exactly a fraction h of agents receives the high income and that a fraction l receives the low income so that there is no uncertainty about the aggregate income y = h y h + l y l at date 1. At date 2, everyone receives an identical income of z, where
The agent enjoys utility of consuming goods at dates 1 and 2, and his or her preferences at date 0 are determined by the expected utility
where c ti denotes date t consumption of the agent whose date 1 income is y i (i = h; l) ; and 2 (0; 1) denotes the common discount factor. We assume u(c) satis…es the usual regularity conditions: u 0 (c) > 0; u" (c) < 0; u 0 (0) = 1 and u 0 (1) = 0: Agents can store goods which allow them to transform x units of goods stored at date 1 into (1= ) x units of goods at date 2.
Public Information and Full Commitment
Before introducing the …nancial frictions, let us examine the economy in which all the information about individual income and storage is public information and individuals can fully commit to obey the contract (i.e., there is no limitation on enforcing contracts). Then the competitive economy corresponds to a solution of the planner's problem in which consumption and the storage (c 1h ; c 2h ; c 1l ; c 2l ; x) are chosen to maximize the expected utility of a typical agent (1) subject to the resource constraints:
When the storage is non-negative, the resource constraints can be combined as
and the solution is
Thus, if there is no friction of information and commitment, individual consumption does not depend upon idiosyncratic income shock, and depends only upon aggregate income, because agents can perfectly insure against the idiosyncratic income risks. With perfect risk sharing, the marginal utility of consumption is equalized across agents. When all agents have identical preferences, consumption is equalized too. Moreover, everyone's consumption should be smoothed over time through storage (whose rate of return is equal to the time preference rate 1= ). The solution of this planner's problem can be considered as an outcome of a competitive economy in which intermediaries compete with each other to o¤er contracts for state-contingent net transfers. Under Bertrand-style competition between intermediaries, the contract o¤ered by all intermediaries in equilibrium would be the contract which maximizes the expected utility of the customers subject to the resource constraints. This frictionless competitive economy -so called Arrow-Debreu economy -serves as a benchmark. However, the prediction appears to contradict the observation that individual consumption signi…cantly depends upon the individual's income (in addition to the aggregate income per capita) in household panel data. (See Altug and Miller (1990) , Cochrane (1991) and Mace (1991) for example). The next sections depart from such a frictionless economy in order to explain the household data.
Private Information of Individual Income
Green and Oh (1991) (which is based upon a classic paper of Green (1987) ) considers private information about individual income as a key friction to explain phenomena like "credit." If individual income is private information, the perfect risk sharing achieved in the Arrow-Debreu economy is no longer compatible with the incentive constraints since everyone would claim to have earned the low income to receive a positive transfer. Thus, when individual income is private information, the allocation rule has to satisfy an incentive constraint which requires high-income agents not to pretend to be a lowincome type:
The left hand side (LHS) denotes the utility when the high-income agent tells the truth to the intermediary about her income. The right hand side (RHS) denotes instead the utility when the high-income agent misrepresents herself as a low-income agent. By pretending to be a low-income agent, she receives the transfer c 1l y l and consumes y h + c 1l y l at date 1, and pays z c l and consumes z (z c l ) = c l at date 2. To derive this, we have assumed that the storage was public information so that no one could use storage privately in order to adjust consumption across dates. Thus, in this environment, the optimal contract (c 1h ; c 2h ; c 1l ; c 2l ) can be found by maximizing the expected utility subject to the resource constraint and the incentive constraint (3) : Hence, the associated Lagrangian is
where and h are the Lagrange multipliers associated to the resource constraint and to the incentive constraint. The …rst order conditions of such a problem require
; we obtain that
In this environment, a "credit"-like arrangement arises as an endogenous outcome of the private information about the individual income. In order to prevent the high-income agent from pretending to be a low-income agent, the intermediary cannot transfer a positive amount to the low-income agent in both periods. Those who consume more than their income at present (like borrowers) have to pay by consuming less than their income in future. Thus, agents cannot be fully insured, since low-income agents consume less than high-income agents.
Moreover, although consumption is smooth over time for the high-income agent, consumption of the low income agent is skewed towards date 1. These are because skewing the consumption of low-income agents towards date 1 reduces the gains of the high-income agent from misrepresenting herself as a low-income agent, and in turn, relaxes the incentive constraint. Figure 1 illustrates the allocation when individual income is private information. The horizontal axis measures the date 1 income and consumption, while the vertical axis measures those of date 2. Under public information and full commitment, the competitive economy achieves the …rst best allocation in which consumption is equalized across agents and across time at point C in the …gure. When the individual income is private information, 
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the consumption of the low income agent is at point C l , in which consumption is larger than income at date 1 but it is smaller than income at date 2 (in order to repay the 'debt'). Moreover, consumption at date 1 is larger than consumption at date 2 (c 1l > c 2l ) for the low-income agent. Consumption of the high-income agent is balanced at point C h : Point C 0 h is consumption if the high-income agent pretends to be a low income agent to receive the net transfer
When we compare the present value of consumption and income, we learn that there is a transfer from the high-income agents to the low-income agents. Both consumption allocations C h and C l are closer to the …rst best allocation C than incomes Y h and Y l in terms of the present value. But consumption is not equalized across agents, because insurance must be imperfect with private information.
Private Information of Individual Income
and Storage (Cole-Kocherlakota) Cole and Kocherlakota (2001) consider an environment in which not only individual income but also storage (saving) are private information. Then the high-income agent who pretends to be a low-income agent can use storage privately in order to smooth consumption. Let V (W ) be date 1 value function, when the agent chooses consumption and storage in order to maximize the utility subject to the constraint that the present value of consumption is equal to W; i.e.,
subject to W = c 1 + c 2 :
By the envelope theorem, the value function satis…es
The incentive constraint of the high income agent has to be modi…ed to take into account the additional friction as
The LHS denotes the utility of the high-income agent who tells the truth. In the RHS, the utility of the high-income agent who misrepresents to be a low income agent is the function of her wealth, which is the sum of the date 1 income gap (that the high-income agent hides) and of the present value of consumption of the low-income agent.
In this set-up, the optimal contract (c 1h ; c 2h ; c 1l ; c 2l ) maximizes the expected utility subject to the resource constraint and the incentive constraint (4) : Using the Lagrangian
the …rst order conditions can be arranged as
Thus we have
The present value of consumption of each agent is equal to the present value of his or her income here. There is no insurance nor transfer of wealth across agents. Because the high-income agent can announce the income which maximizes the present value of net transfer from the intermediary, the present value of net transfer must be zero for both high-income and low-income agents. The intermediary cannot cross subsidize agents, because all agents would choose to receive the subsidy and not to pay to the intermediary.
On the other hand, consumption is smooth over time. Therefore, Cole and Kocherlakota (2001) provides a mechanism design foundation of "permanent income theory of consumption" by Friedman (1967) -individual consumption reacts to idiosyncratic income shocks, even though agents can smooth consumption over time. This result is valuable because the optimal contract becomes simpler and more 'realistic,'when privation information about storage is added to a model with private information about income.
Limited Commitment
In a decentralized market economy, people often do not keep their promises and the intermediary cannot enforce contracts completely. This is a problem of limited commitment on the side of the agents and limited contract enforcement on the side of the intermediary. Suppose that the income is paid directly to the individual who cannot commit to pay a large fraction of income in future. It is not easy for the intermediary to enforce the individual to pay a large amount which contracts specify. In this setup the …nancial friction can arise endogenously. In fact, such limitations in commitment and enforcement can generate the …nancial friction even if individual income is public information.
To be more speci…c, suppose that the agent will not pay more than 2 0; 1) fraction of present and future income, and that nobody can take away any fraction of the individual's storage. Then consumption of low-income agent cannot be smaller than 1 fraction of income at date 2:
because the intermediary cannot force him to pay more than z. At date 1, the high-income agent will not give up more than fraction of her wealth. The incentive constraint for a high-income agent to follow her intermediary's speci…ed net transfer requires
The optimal contract (c 1h ; c 2h ; c 1l ; c 2l ) maximizes the expected utility of a typical agent subject to the resource constraint and the two incentive constraints (5; 6) : If is su¢ ciently small, both incentive constraints are binding, and thus we have:
The RHS of the …rst equation is permanent income of the high-income agent which no intermediary can take away Holmstrom and Tirole (1999) call it "non-pledgeable" income. The second equation says consumption of the lowincome agent is equal to his non-pledgeable income at date 2. In the RHS of the last equation, the …rst term is the non-pledgeable income of the lowincome agent. The numerator of the second term is the fraction of the aggregate wealth which the intermediary can reallocate across agents Holmstrom and Tirole call it "pledgeable" wealth. 1 Thus the optimal contract under such a severe limitation of contract enforcement requires the intermediary to allocate all the pledgeable wealth to the most needy agents, i.e., the low income agents at date 1. Here, unlike the previous examples of the private information economy, the low-income agent faces a binding contract enforcement constraint (loosely speaking, the bankruptcy constraint). A distinctive characteristic of an economy with limited commitment (but without private information) is that, although the resource base which contracts can reallocate is limited, there is no further restriction on how contracts can reallocate the pledgeable wealth.
Limited Commitment and Private Information
What happens if the individual income and storage are private information and the individual cannot commit to pay a large amount to the intermediary in future? Formally, the optimal contract (c 1h ; c 2h ; c 1l ; c 2l ) would maximize the expected utility subject to the resource constraint and the three incentive constraints (4; 5; 6) : As argued above, with the private information about individual income and storage, the intermediary cannot cross subsidize agents, and the present value of net transfer must be zero for all agents. Thus (6) is not binding. Then, using the Lagrangian
Then when is small enough; we have
Thus, as in permanent income theory, the present value of the individual consumption is equal to the individual income there is no insurance. Moreover, the low-income agent faces a binding borrowing constraint at date 1. He can borrow only against fraction of pledgeable future income. His date 1 consumption is equal to his current income and the present value of his pledgeable future income in (8) . Therefore limitations in commitment and private information of income and saving lead to a permanent income theory of consumption with borrowing constraints arguably the most common contract we observe in data. In Figure 2 y l at date 1 because he can commit to pay only z at date 2. The consumption of the high-income agent is unchanged at C h : The high-income agent is not constrained in her borrowing, because she lends to the intermediary instead of borrowing at date 1. 2 
Concluding Remark
In this article, we illustrate how 'credit'like arrangements arise endogenously and take a particular form in response to both private information of individual income and storage, and limited commitment. So far we have ignored the problem of the incentive constraint of the intermediary. But, how do we know that the intermediaries are trustworthy? What happens if the intermediary has private information or limited commitment? There is some literature on this. 3 Given that …nancial intermediaries experienced signi…cant …nancing constraints during the recent …nancial crisis, we expect that active research will take place in a near future which accounts for incentive constraints of the intermediary in the tradition of mechanism design and general equilibrium literature.
